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ABSTRACT
Today, more than 5,000 diseases are cataloged as “rare” by the scientiﬁc community, so long as they aﬄict
small sections of population. Due to the lack of economic proﬁtability, the pharmaceutical industry has been
traditionally reluctant to invest time and money in developing and marketing drugs for these ailments, and
such market failure had to be corrected by Government action in form of various incentives.
The US Orphan Drug Act of 1983 pioneered the regulation of this type of medicines, and its success encour-
aged other countries to enact similar legislation. Among these new orphan drug laws is the one that was
drafted in the European Union in 2000. This paper attempts to scrutinize some of the key points of the
initial American regulatory framework as well as the main criticisms that it received and to subsequently
take a look at the responses that European authorities have devised to address such attacks to the American
text. The overwhelming satisfaction surrounding US law may explain the great similarity with its European
younger brother, even though the “copy” has tried to make some modest contributions from its own, for
instance while addressing what perhaps is the most serious caveat of the law: the abuses by the industry
that lead to high prices and “blockbuster orphans”. However, both jurisdictions still have some more aspects
to ameliorate in order to create a more perfect set of incentives that may assure the availability of remedies
for rare diseases striking a better balance between competition and innovation. Besides, some newly raised
issues, like the necessity of international cooperation to address the challenges posed by a global pharma-
ceutical market and the need for extending the beneﬁts of orphan drug legislation to so-called “third-world
diseases”, are awaiting legal answers.
1.
Introduction.
1Today, there are more than 5,000 diseases, about 10% of the total number of human ailments, which the
medical community considers to qualify for the label of “rare diseases,” aﬀecting between 45 and 55 million
people in the United States and the European Union alone1. Despite the heterogeneity of this category, rare
disorders present a common feature: they are so unusual and infrequent that in most cases an appropriate
treatment is not available2 3. The possible remedies for rare diseases are usually called “orphan drugs”4,
since in normal market conditions no sponsor would show up as a parent to take them through the pre-market
scrutiny by the regulatory agencies. Due to the small prevalence of rare diseases, the pharmaceutical industry
is unwilling to “adopt” these treatments, so long as the foreseen sales and beneﬁts are scarce, specially in view
of the huge development costs required for getting a new drug into the market5. Confronting this problem,
the governments of many countries have noticed the necessity of some form of public intervention that may
assure orphan patients a remedy for their illnesses and act consequently. From a public policy perspective,
the main action taken to assure the availability of these medicines has been the establishment of various
publicly-sustained incentives in order for the pharmaceutical industry to market them in suﬃcient quantities.
Roughly, these beneﬁts may be classiﬁed in two groups. First, the hallmark incentive implemented by all
the regulators in the various countries which have passed orphan drug laws has been the conferral of a
so-called market exclusivity right to the “adopters” for a given number of years6, which prevent others from
commercializing the same drug during this period, therefore increasing substantially the prospects of reaping
the investment previously made. Yet, there is a second main group of incentives used to spur the production
1Robin E. Margolis, Is Orphan Drug Act Compromise Near? 11 No.7 HealthSpan 21, 21 (1994); Thomas Maeder, The
Orphan Drug Backlash, 288 (5) Sci. Am. 80, 82 (2003); Fran¸ coise Grossetˆ ete, “Research and Development of Orphan Drugs:
at Last a European Regulation” in The European Regulation on Orphan Medicinal Products, 3 Pharmaceuticals Policy and
Law 7, 7 (2001) ,Other authors suggest that the total number of rare disorders should be reviewed, and may actually reach
8,000. Erik Tambuyzer, The European Orphan Medicinal Products Regulation and the Biotechnology-based Industry in Europe,
6 Journal of Commercial Biotechnology, 340-344 (2000).
2Alvaro Lavandeira, Orphan Drugs: legal aspects, current situation 8 Haemophilia 194, 195-196 (2002). Among these rare
diseases it is possible to cite diﬀerent varieties of tumors like ovarian cancer or many kinds of leukemia, some AIDS-related
opportunistic diseases, and genetic diseases such as cystic ﬁbrosis. The National Organization of Rare Diseases (NORD) web
page contains a highly detail database of rare disorders at <http://www.rarediseases.org>.
3All countries which have drafted orphan drug legislation tend to use prevalence, that is, number of people aﬀected by a
particular disease, to select those ailments for which orphan drugs may be designated. The World Health Organization considers
as being rare disorders only the diseases that aﬀect 0.65-1 out of every 1,000 people. Lavandeira, supra note 2, at 195-196.
4Orphan drugs can be generally deﬁned as “drugs intended to treat rare diseases whose potential sales are not large enough
to justify funding of the necessary animal and clinical tests”. Peter B. Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases
and Materials, 566 (2nd ed. 1991).
5It has been estimated that it costs on average around $300 million dollars and takes not less than a decade to market any
drug. Gary A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What’s Right with It 15 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 299, 304
(1999).
6The length of the exclusive marketing rights varies from country to country, in a range that goes from the ten-period chosen
by the European rules and the Japanese Orphan Drug Program to the seven years used by the US Orphan Drug Act. Paola
Minghetti et al. A Proposal to Improve the Supply of Orphan Drugs, Pharmacological Research, Vol. 42, no.1, 33-35 (2000)
2and marketing of orphan medicinal products which encompasses, among others, grants and subsidies to
ﬁnance the various clinical trials required to prove the safety and eﬀectiveness of the drug, waivers of various
administrative fees, tax credits and diverse means of support and administrative guidance by the public
agencies through the whole process.
While approaching the regulation of orphan medicinal products, it should be noted that what the orphan
drug rulemakers are dealing with is the intersection between market and health. Orphan legislation tries
in essence to provide an equal access to health to all people that suﬀer from any disease, no matter its
nature. Governments have recognized the limits of the market to supply society with a remedy for every
single disease, and thus took a step forward to avoid an scenario where the access to health protection would
depend on how many fellow citizens present the same problem, or, to put it in other terms, on how proﬁtable
is the drug a particular patient needs. Orphan legislation is thus a solution designed to address this very
conﬂict between medicine and economics by pushing toward the right of all citizens to a certain level of
health protection7.
This paper tries to identify the main concerns and critiques that have arisen from the U.S. experience since
the drafting of the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 and to examine the responses that its “younger brother” in
the European Union has oﬀered to tackle all these controversial points. Three main topics will be covered in
diﬀerent sections, in addition to a ﬁnal set of conclusions. In the ﬁrst place, section 2 deals with the historical
background of the actual regulations on both sides of the Atlantic ocean, from the appearance of the ﬁrst laws
in the United States to the translation to legal terms of the European policy in 2000. It also encompasses
a description of the main characteristics of the regulatory schemes implemented in the diﬀerent countries,
with special attention to both the US and the EU. Section 3 consists basically of a general assessment of
the practical outcomes produced by these legal frameworks in each side of the Atlantic Ocean. Section 4
constitutes the core of this work, speciﬁcally addressing all the purported caveats and contentious points
identiﬁed by commentators, industry and patients within the American system; and referring to how the
European authorities have faced these challenges. Finally, Section 5 provides some conclusions in light of
the comparative analysis of both jurisdictions described before.
7The “right to health” has been recognized in a variety of international texts on human rights, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (article 25.1) or the 1961 Social Charter of the Council of Europe (article 11). For a
general discussion on these issues, cf. Lavandeira, supra note 2, at 194-195.
32.
The Treatment of Rare Diseases and the Birth and Raise of orphan
drug legislation.
The birth of the orphan drug laws took place in the United States during the early 80s. The US Orphan
Drug Act of 19838 has been the model for other countries when addressing the regulation of orphan medicinal
products. This piece of legislation has internationally been recognized as a “booster” for the introduction of
orphan medicinal products9, and happened to be widely used as a model for a sound orphan drug policy in
many other countries. Today, nations like Japan, Korea and Australia have orphan drug legislation drawn in
mostly from the American text10. However, the most important step taken towards a worldwide regulation
on orphan medicinal products was the drafting of appropriate rules in the European Union via Regulations
in 1999-2000. The US and the EU (without the 10 new countries entering as of May 1, 2004) account for
nearly 75% of R&D for pharmaceuticals and biologics and represent two-thirds of the world pharmaceutical
market11. In light of this data, the importance of both legal frameworks on orphan drugs seems obvious,
and mutual feedback appears to be a necessity to enrich both systems and promote global cooperation.
The purpose of this section is to explore the historical development of orphan drug laws, from the US Orphan
Drug Act to the recent implementation of the European Policy on the ﬁeld.
2.1.
The Beginning: the US Orphan Drug Act of 1983 and its History.
This story begins in the early 80s, when American public opinion became increasingly concerned about the
situation of millions of fellow citizens suﬀering from rare diseases. Congress began to consider taking action
to resolve the orphan drug problem, holding hearings starting in 1980, in the midst of strong advocacy
8Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codiﬁed as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§360aa-360ee (1994), 26
U.S.C. §45C (Supp. II 1994), 42 U.S.C. §236 (1994).
9Cf. as an example, Josep Torrent Farnell & Rosa Morros, “The EU Challenges on the Designation of Orphan Medicinal
Products”, in European Regulation on Orphan Medicinal Products, 3 Pharmaceuticals Policy and Law 19, 19-20 (2001).
10Minghetti et al., supra note 6, at 34.
11Christopher-Paul Milne et al., Orphan Drug Laws in Europe and the US: Incentives for the
Research and Development of Medicines for the Diseases of Poverty, Commission of Macroe-
conomics and Health of the WHO Working Paper no. WG2:8, 4; available in English at
<http://www3.who.int/whosis/cmh/cmh papers/e/papers.cfm?path=cmh,cmh papers&language=english>
4eﬀorts by patient organizations like NORD, the support of the medical profession, stark opposition by
the pharmaceutical industry and the reluctance of the FDA itself, which preferred to deal with the problem
through a more ﬂexible application of the general administrative requirements12. The Act was ﬁnally enacted
in December 198213, laying out the basics of the ﬁrst speciﬁc orphan drug policy ever adopted in the world.
The 1983 Act deﬁned orphan drug by referring to the concept of “rare disease or condition” in the United
States, which in turn was deﬁned as any ailment which is so uncommon that “there is no reasonable ex-
pectation that the cost of developing and making available in the United States a drug for such disease or
condition will be recovered from sales in the United States of such drug”14. The only criteria for designation
used in the original version of the Act was therefore the economic viability of the drug represented by the
expected revenues from sales not covering the costs. Besides, any orphan drug which deserved this denomi-
nation under the original text had to be unpatented or unpatentable under the patent laws, since Congress
believed that these norms aﬀorded enough protection for the investment to be made and consequently there
was no need for further legal shield. Once these requisites were met, the Act provided that FDA should
confer the product a designation as “orphan drug”, immediately beneﬁting from all the incentives laid down.
Although we will revisit this issue later on when discussing the practical outcome of the law and its alleged
ﬂaws, a brief account of the advantages embodied in the Orphan Drug Act for all designated products were
as follows15:
-
Seven years of market exclusivity for the designated orphan indication of
the product. During this time, no identical and competing product will receive marketing
authorization from FDA16;
12David B. Clissold, Prescription for the Orphan Drug Act: the Impact of FDA’s 1992 Regulations and the Latest Congres-
sional Proposals for Reform 50 Food & Drug L.J. 125, 127-128 (1995), citing various Congressional hearings.
13As a curiosity, some commentators have suggested that the deﬁnitive catalyst for the introduction of the Act was the wide
public reaction to an episode of the TV show Quincy, M.E. broadcasted in March 1981, showcasing the story of a boy with
Tourette’s syndrome. Pulsinelli, supra note 5 at 305.
14Orphan Drug Act,, Pub. L. No. 97-114, §526(a)(2), 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codiﬁed as amended at 21 U.S.C. §360bb(a)(2)
(1994)).
15In addition to all these incentives, the Orphan Drug Act also created the so-called “Orphan Products Board” (OPB),
depending of the Department of Health and Human Services, as the body in charge of the coordination and control of all
governmental policies and programs in the ﬁeld. As Pulsinelli points out, many of the expected tasks of the OPB are actually
under the FDA’s Oﬃce of Orphan Product Development (e.g. the management of the grant program). Pulsinelli, supra note 5
at 313.
5- Federal grants to fund clinical trials of designated orphan products and protocol assistance by the FDA17;
- Tax credits for such clinical trials.ALGAnt´ on Leis Garc´ ıa
During the ﬁrst year after the Act came into eﬀect, it became apparent that the response of the industry
was not what the legislators initially expected18, particularly due to the heavy burden that producers faced
to demonstrate the costs of the intended orphan drugs to show that market conditions would render them
unproﬁtable19. The legislative response was the 1984 Amendment to the Act, which modiﬁed the text to add
a presumption of unproﬁtability when the disease or condition has a patent population of less than 200,000
in the United States, which remains today in the text of Section 526 of the actual version of the Act20.
In 1985, the second main amendment of the Act took place. Congress changed the text to apply market
exclusivity protection to patented and patentable drugs, in an attempt to increase protection to products
with a patent life about to be over21. Besides, determining whether a particular drug was patentable or
not lead in fact to delays in the designation of orphan drugs, provided that in some cases assistance by the
Patent and Trademark Oﬃce was required22.
Despite many further attempts that will be discussed in the fourth section of this paper, the last amendment
to the Orphan Drug Act occurred in 1988. Congress had then to repair various errors and to reauthorize some
provisions that where close to expiring (e.g. grant appropriations). Some other minor rules of administrative
nature were introduced, for instance the one that requires sponsors to notify the FDA any interruption in
17“Protocol assistance” refers to permanent guidance and support provided by FDA to sponsors during the investigations
leading to ﬁnal market approval. Bear in mind that the reduced prevalence of market diseases poses several obstacles for
producers to develop accurate and eﬀective clinical trials. Open protocols happened to be a solution to this problem by allowing
the manufacturer to supply patients not participating in the clinical trials with the drug while they are still in progress, and
therefore were laid down in Section 528 of the Act. Id. 311-312.
18During this ﬁrst year, only 15 requests were ﬁlled from which 10 lead to designated products. Cf. generally Orphan
Drug Act Oversight Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 719 (1984).
19Clissold, supra note 10 at 128-129; David Duﬃeld Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: an Engine of Innovation? At What
Cost? 55 Food & Drug L.J. 125, 129 (2000).
20The establishment of this “bright-line rule” was regarded with some concern by many observers, such as the Oﬃce of
Management and Budget (OMB), so long as it might lead to abuses with regard to highly-priced drugs. Id. at 129. This kind
of fears have been constant since the Orphan Drug Act was passed, and have lead to passionate discussions that we will address
in subsection 4.1 below.
21Id. at 130.
22Pulsinelli, supra note 5 at 308. The 1985 amendment also expanded the scope of the Act to include antibiotics and provided
for research grants to cover all “qualiﬁed testing” instead of just “qualiﬁed clinical testing”, also prorogating these grants or
the following three years. Id. 308.
6the manufacturing of any approved orphan product at least one year in advance23.
The regulatory scheme was not complete until January 1993, when the FDA approved and put into eﬀect
the deﬁnitive version of the so-called Orphan Drug Regulations24, which established express rules on the
administrative procedures for obtaining an orphan drug designation and clariﬁed some traditional problems
regarding the wording of the Act, in particular those related to the criteria used to consider a drug “diﬀerent”
from another with regard to market exclusivity right, and to the meaning of “clinical superiority” as an
exception to such a right25. These issues will be reviewed in depth in Subsection 4.2., while discussing some
of the controversies arising from certain ambiguities of the law.
The three main amendments of the Orphan Drug Act described above (1984, 1985 and 1988) are only a few
of the proposed modiﬁcations of the statute that have come under public scrutiny during the last twenty
years. There have been other several diﬀerent attempts to change the letter of the law that have triggered no
tangible results26. These proposals will be discussed below when dealing with the various critiques received
by the actual system, so long as they tried to correct some of the alleged deﬁciencies detected in the 1983
Act.
2.2.
The International Spread of Orphan Regulations.
The tremendous success that the American orphan drug legislation experienced specially once the initial
reluctance of the industry was overcome after the 1984 amendments induced other governments to put
in place similar programs that may enable the industry to produce and market drugs for the treatment
and diagnosis of rare diseases27. Diﬀerent governments began to adopt diﬀerent and sometimes isolated
23Orphan Drug Act,, Pub. L. No. 97-114, §526(b)(1), 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codiﬁed as amended at 21 U.S.C. §360bb(b)(1)
(1994)).
2457 Fed. Reg. 62,076 (Dec. 29, 1992). The initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was published almost a year before (56
Fed. Reg. 3,338 (Jan. 29 1991)).
25The 1993 Regulations embody as well some norms over the information disclosure obligation applying to all sponsors in
order for them to eﬀectively show that their products fall within the deﬁnition of “orphan drug” described above (21 C.F.R.
§316.29(a) (1998)).
26The two main initiatives to amend the Orphan Drug Act took place in 1990 and 1994. The former amendment was vetoed
by President George H. Bush and the later was not even enacted.
27For a general discussion on comparative orphan drug programs, cf. Mae Thamer et al., A Cross-national Comparison of
Orphan Drug Policies: Implications for the U.S. Orphan Drug Act in 23 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 265 (1998).
7measures28, and later embarked on comprehensive legislative initiatives.
Japan kicked oﬀ its orphan drug program in October 1993 by amending the Pharmaceutical Aﬀairs Law
and other ancillary regulations and setting up a complete system for orphan products designation and a full
catalog of incentives for their development and marketing29. Orphan products are initially reviewed by the
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Evaluation Center and the Central Pharmaceutical Aﬀairs Council
and later designated by the Minister of Health and Welfare. The designation criteria is not only based
exclusively on prevalence (less than 50,000 patients in Japan, <0.04% of the population30), but also on the
high probability of development as shown by data provided by the sponsor and the inexistence of equivalent
alternative, i.e. with the same or superior eﬃcacy or safety31. The Japanese program provides for a 10-year
period of market exclusivity, coupled with some other incentives (e.g. grants, tax deductions, consultations
with the agency and fast track review of approval)32. So far, Japanese authorities have designated 167
orphan drugs and 10 devices, as published in the web page of the Japanese Organization for Pharmaceutical
Safety and Research 33.
Australia has also implemented a “robust but still incipient” orphan drugs program34. The Australian
Government has recently introduced via an interagency agreement an automatic recognition mechanism
that allows the orphan products designated as such in the United States by the FDA to reach the Australian
market almost inmediately. In 1997, a comprehensive Orphan Drug Policy was drafted and implemented35.
2.3.
The Orphan Laws Cross the Atlantic: the European Union Ap-
proach to Orphan Drug Regulation.
28For instance, Singapore established, with FDA assistance, an importation exemption for orphan medicinal products des-
ignated by recognized foreign regulatory agencies that intend to enter the country. Marlene E. Haﬀter, “Rare Diseases and
Orphan drugs”, in European Regulation on Orphan Medicinal Products, 3 Pharmaceuticals Policy and Law 37, 38 (2001).
29Mamoru Narukawa, “Japanese Approach to Orphan Drugs”, in European Regulation on Orphan Medicinal Products, 3
Pharmaceuticals Policy and Law 41, 41 (2001).
30Minghetti et al., supra note 6, at 34-35.
31Narukawa, supra note 29, at 41.
32Id. 41-42.
33Cf.< http://www.kiko.go.jp/download/ListofOrphanProducts20040213.xls> (last accessed: February 29th 2004).
34Milne at al., supra note 11, at 4.
35Lavandeira, supra note 5, at 197. The Australian regulations provide for an exclusive marketing period of 5 years and the
exemption of the normal fees charged by the Therapeutic Goods Administration for the approval of any drug. Cf., generally,
Depatment of Health and Aged Care, The Orphan Drug Program and Improving Community Access to Eﬀective Drugs for
Rare Diseases (2001), at <http://www.health.gov.au/tga/docs/pdf/orphrev.pdf>.
8Some member States of the European Union had been active during the 90s taking some actions towards a
broad regulation on orphan medicinal products, even before any initiative was promoted at the Community
level36. A public debate within the European institutions ensued regarding the convenience of following in
US footsteps on the ﬁeld through a comprehensive regulation covering the Common Market as a whole.
Rare diseases have been a focus of attention for the European Commission since 1994, when the BIOMED 2
program, within the context of the 4th Framework Program for research and technological development (1994-
1998) provided funding for 23 research projects up to a total appropriation of ¨ A8.65 million37. Moreover, rare
conditions were further classiﬁed as a “priority area” for Community action in the context of the Framework
for action in the ﬁeld of public health38, after the Commission presented a proposal of Decision of the
European Parliament and the Council adopting a program of community action for the period 1999-2003 on
rare diseases39.
On July 27 1998, the European Commission published its proposal for a European Parliament and Council
Regulation on orphan medicinal products40. At the European Parliament, the Committee on the Environ-
ment, Public Health and Consumer Protection issued a report amending in ﬁrst reading proposal in terms
that were not accepted by the Commission41. The second proposal was approved by the Parliament in a
plenary session held in December 1999 and by the Council. That was the birth of Regulation (EC) No
141/2000 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal products42
(hereinafter “Regulation 141/2000”), the basic norm outlining the European policy on the ﬁeld of rare dis-
36This was the case of France, whose Government included orphan medicine development as a priority subject within the
Cabinet program for the European Union in 1995 during the French Presidency of the Council. The Health Minister at that
time, Mme. Simone Weil also created a ministerial mission concentrated in orphan drug policy, gathering an important amount
of expertise on the ﬁeld. European Foundation for the Advancement of Medicine, Workshop on “Rare Diseases and Orphan
Drugs: European Perspective”, Brussels, May 5 1998, [hereinafter Workshop on Rare Diseases and Orphan Drugs], intervention
by Annie Wolf, 30-31.
37Bruno Hansen, “Perspective from the European Commission”, in European Regulation on Orphan Medicinal Products, 3
Pharmaceuticals Policy and Law 43, 43 (2001). Budgetary provisions for research in the treatment of rare diseases were also
included in the Fifth Framework Program (1998-2002)
38COM (1993) 559 ﬁnal & COM (1997) 225 ﬁnal.
39OJ L 155, 22.6.1999, p.1, Decision No 1295/1999 EC of the Parliament and the Council of 29 April 1999 adopting a
programme of Community action on rare diseases within the framework for action in the ﬁeld of public health (1999 to 2003).
40COM (1998) 450 ﬁnal. The aim of the proposal was described in the text itself as “[establishing] a Community procedure
for designating orphan medicinal products and to introduce incentives for orphan medicinal products research, development
and marketing, in particular by granting exclusive marketing rights for a ten year period”.
41Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on Orphan Medicinal Products. A4-0078/99.
Rapporteur: Christian Cabrol. For a complete list of the changes proposed and a description of the procedures before the
ﬁnal version of the Regulation was published cf., Jos´ e Luis Valverde, “Editorial” in European Regulation on Orphan Medicinal
Products, 3 Pharmaceuticals Policy and Law 1-5 (2001).
42OJ L 18, 22.1.2000, p.1. The ﬁnal version was highly coincident with the initial proposal by the Commission.
9eases and orphan drugs, which entered into force on April 28th 2000. Commission Regulation (EC) No
847/2000, of 27 April 2000, laying down the provisions for implementation of the criteria for designation of a
medicinal product as an orphan medicinal product and deﬁnitions of the concepts “similar medicinal prod-
uct” and “clinical superiority”43 (hereinafter “Regulation 847/2000), followed to precise some procedures
and concepts advanced in Regulation 141/2000. The aim of the initiative was clear: to provide, in similar
fashion to the US Orphan Drug Act, an attractive environment for the pharmaceutical industry to develop
and market drugs for rare diseases in the European Union44. The obvious ties to the American regulation
were expressly recognized throughout the entire drafting process45.
The scope of Regulation 141/2000 is limited to “medicinal products for human use” within the meaning of
Directive 65/65/EEC46, which refers in turn to any substance or combination of substances which may be
administered to human beings with a view to making a medical diagnosis or for treating or preventing a
disease”. From this wording, it is important to note that while vaccines fall squarely within breath of the
regulation, medical devices and nutrition supplements are not covered, similarly to the initial version US
regulation47.
Article 3.1 of the Regulation establishes the criteria for designation of orphan medicinal products, which
combine a epidemiological feature (prevalence ﬁgure in the total Community population of less than 5 per
10,000)48 with an economic test (alleged economic unviability). Either element must be established by the
sponsor, who is also obligated to show that there is no “satisfactory” method of diagnosis, prevention or
43OJ L 103, 28.4.2000, p.5. This complementary Regulation is speciﬁc about the criteria for designation (i.e. prevalence,
potential for return on investment and existence of other methods of diagnosis, prevention or treatment), setting detailed rules
on the required data. It also ﬁxes a detailed set of deﬁnitions for terms laid down in the Regulation 141/2000, such as “signiﬁcant
beneﬁt” or “clinically superior”. This issues will be revisited throughout Section 4.
44Preamble of Regulation 141/2000. OJ L 18, 22.1.2000, p.1.
45Cf., for instance, the Explanatory Memorandum that headed the initial Proposal of Regulation adopted by the Commission.
Supra note 40.
46Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative
action related to medicinal products. OJ 22, 9.2.1965m p. 369 (Directive as last amended by Directive 93/39EEC at OJ L 214,
24.8.1993, p.22).
47Recall that Japan did include medical devices within its orphan product program. Cf. supra note 33. Recently, the US
Orphan Drug Program was expanded to include medical foods and devices that meet the orphan criteria set out in the Orphan
Drug Act. Milne at al., supra note 11, at 5. As for medical devices, the “Orphan Product Development Program” and the
Humanitarian Device Exemption embodied in the Safe Medical Device Act of 1990 but created in 1996, and detailed by FDA
regulations have implemented a system that strikingly resembles that of the Orphan Drug Act. Brigitte Casteels-Rappagliosi,
“Rare diseases and medical devices in the European Union”, in European Regulation on Orphan Medicinal Products, 3 Phar-
maceuticals Policy and Law 69, 71-72 (2001).
48Note that this ratio is below the benchmark ruling in the US (7.5 per 10,000) and slightly over the Japanese (4 per
10,000). Emer Cooke, “The European Regulation on Orphan Medicinal Products” in European Regulation on Orphan Medicinal
Products, 3 Pharmaceuticals Policy and Law 11, 13 (2001).
10treatment of the condition in question or, if such method exists, that the medicinal product will provide
patients with “signiﬁcant beneﬁt”49. Importantly, the condition targeted by the drug must be a “life-
threatening, seriously debilitating or serious and chronic” ailment, and the indication of the drug must be
medically plausible.
Article 4 cope with the institutional design of the European orphan drug policy. A new body within the
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA)50 was created: the Committee of
Orphan Medicinal Products (COMP), whose two main missions are the examination of any application for
the designation of a medicinal product as an orphan drug, and the assistance to the Commission on any
matter in relation with the Community policy on orphan drugs. One of the interesting features of this new
organization is that among its members, three (from a total of 21 plus a Chairperson) are designated by the
European Commission to represent patients’ organizations, which warmly welcome this attempt to provide
those who are the ﬁnal recipients of the regulation the with a voice on their own to oﬀer their positions
during the rulemaking and administration of the whole program51 52.
The designation procedure laid out in Article 5 is purportedly “rapid and ﬂexible”53. Applications should
be addressed to the Agency Secretariat, which, in coordination with a rapporteur, processes the ﬁle. The
COMP has to deliver its opinion in 90 days from the Secretariat’s validation of the application. EMEA then
forwards the opinion to the European Commission and the sponsor, who in the event of a negative decision
may ﬁll an appeal before the COMP54. The European Commission shall take all ﬁnal decisions 30 days after
its reception, but they rarely diﬀer from the initial opinions by the COMP55. With a favorable decision by
49Article 3.2 refers the implementation of the ﬁrst paragraph to the Commission. Commission Regulation 847/2000 happens
to fulﬁll this requirement. Cf. generally Communication from the Commission on Regulation (EC) no 141/2000 on orphan
medicinal products, OJ C 178, 29.7.2003, p.2.
50For a general discussion on the role of COMP and EMEA, cf. Patrick Le Courtois & Melanie Carr, “Orphan Medicinal
Products: the Role of the EMEA” in European Regulation on Orphan Medicinal Products, 3 Pharmaceuticals Policy and Law
31-35 (2001).
51Cf. Workshop on Rare Diseases and Orphan Drugs, interventions by Abbey Meyers (23-24) and St´ ephane Korsia (25-27),
representing patients’ organizations in the US and Europe.
52The COMP is actually presided by a Spanish physician, Professor Josep Torrent Farnell, and encompasses 21 full members
designated by either the member states or the Commission. There are also observers by various organizations, as well as from
the acceding countries. <http://www.emea.eu.int/htms/general/contacts/COMP.html> (last accessed: February 29th 2004).
53Cooke, supra note 48, at 14. However, signiﬁcant delays occur between designation and ﬁnal marketing authorization (cf.
discussion in 4.7. over the so-called “regulatory lag”).
54EME recently released a set of rules on the internal procedure for Orphan Medicinal Product Des-
ignation, where the above-described process is detailed. EMEA/8212/00/Rev 1. Also available at
<http://www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/human/comp/821200en.pdf>.
55Cooke, supra note 48, at 14.
11the Commission, the candidate product shall be entered in the Community Register of Orphan Medicinal
Products, thereby acquiring all the beneﬁts and privileges inherent to the condition of “designated orphan
medicinal product”56.
The set of incentives and beneﬁts accruing to designated orphan medicinal products in the European Union
are established in Articles 6 through 9 of the Regulation 141/2000. Some of them are parallel to similar
measures in the US regulatory framework, such as the scientiﬁc advice provided via “protocol assistance,”
the fee waivers, and most notably the market exclusivity rights.
Protocol assistance in the Regulation 141/2000 tries to tackle the several speciﬁc problems that rare dis-
eases and orphan drugs pose in relation with the viability of accurate trials and research. The Scientiﬁc
Advice Working Group (SAWG) within EMEA is the body in charge of providing such assistance through a
continuous feedback between the sponsors, a full network of external experts and the SAWG itself57. This
assistance goes on between designation and marketing approval and indeed continues after the orphan drug
is introduced into the market58 59.
Designated orphan medicinal products are also eligible for fee reductions for all charges payable under
Community rules on drug marketing authorization60. This includes fees for both pre-authorization activities
such as protocol assistance and for all actions under the market centralized procedure, i.e., application for
marketing authorization before the EMEA (as distinguished from the marketing authorization obtained from
one Member State authority, which allows commercialization all across the EU territory due to the principle
of mutual recognition), post-authorization activities (e.g. annual fees) and the like61 62.
56Article 5 paragraphs 11 and 12 deal with the transfer and removal of the designation. Interestingly, once it is demonstrated
that the requisites of Article 3 are not longer met in respect of the particular product before the market authorization, such
product will be eﬀectively removed from the Register (Article 5.12(c)).
57Cf. generally, EMEA Guidance for Companies Requesting Protocol Assistance, EMEA/H/238/02 Rev.1, also available at
<http://www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/human/sciadvice/023802en.pdf>.
58Id. at 2.
59As of February 2003, SAWG had received 18 new applications for Protocol Assistance. EMEA, Report on the First 3-
year mandate of the Committee for Orphan Medicinal Products: April 2000 – April 2003, EMEA/9118/03, also available at
<http://www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/human/comp/911803en.pdf> [hereinafter, “EMEA Report”], 25.
60Marketing authorization procedures are laid down in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93 of 22 July 1993 laying down
Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and estab-
lishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products. OJ L 214, 24.8.1993, p.1.
61EMEA Public Statement on Fee Reductions for Designated Orphan Medicinal Products, EMEA/H/4042/01 Rev. 4, 1, also
available at <http://www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/human/comp/404201en.pdf>.
62The budgeting appropriations available for fee exemptions during year 2003 amounted to ¨ A3,300,000, which enabled EMEA
to apply a reduction of 100% of the value of Protocol Assistance fees and 50% in all other cases. Id. 1. EMEA had requested
12Finally, the EU law also included market exclusivity as the North star in the constellation of incentives
for orphan medicinal products, the crucial element to assure availability of orphan drugs63. Although this
particular issue will be examined deeply throughout Section 4, it is possible to suggest that the protection
is only granted when the drug has been designated as orphan medicinal product by the Commission, and
when marketing authorization has been issued by either the Community or all the 15 states (Article 8.1).
This “shield” prevents EU and national authorities from granting a marketing authorization for the “same
product” deﬁned in terms of the same active substance and for the same indication within the following 10
years64. The duration of the protection may however be reduced to 6 years in the event that the criteria
used for designation no longer apply. Indeed, exclusive rights may be interrupted in two cases: when the
holder of those rights is unable to meet the demand of the product with enough quantities thereof, and when
another applicant is able to establish that this own version of the drug is “safer, more eﬀective or otherwise
clinically superior”65. Regulation 847/2000 elaborates a bit on this vague concepts, solving (or attempting
to do so) some huge practical problems, as Section 4 of this essay describes in more detail.
Two main incentives provided in the United States, speciﬁc grants funding clinical and nonclinical trials and
tax credits, are lacking in the European regulatory scheme. The explanation for the absence of the latter
is straightforward: the European institutions have no power on taxation regulations other than on those
related to indirect levies and customs duties66. The application of tax beneﬁts to orphan drug sponsors is
deferred therefore to the member States, among which some have decided to do so67. With regard to grant
programs, the approach taken in Europe has been diﬀerent from the one in the US. Instead of funding clinical
and nonclinical trials of designated drugs, the European authorities have included rare diseases as one of the
priorities of broader programs on research and development programs that frequently encompass diﬀerent
kinds of subsidies and funding. The above-mentioned 4th Framework Program initiated a path carried on
today by the 6th edition of the same initiative (applied since the beginning of 2004), which support investi-
gational activities on rare diseases within the thematic priority “Life, science, genomics and biotechnology
for health”68. Therefore, neither the EMEA nor any other entity within the Community provides sponsors
63Cooke, supra note 48, at 15.
64Id., at 15-16.
65Article 8.3(a) also provides for marketing by non-holders of exclusive rights under its consent.
66Cf. Articles 95-99 of the European Community Treaty. OJ C 325, 24.12.2002, p.1 (consolidated version after the Treaty of
Nice).
67France and the United Kingdom have created speciﬁc tax credits for orphan drug research and development enterprises.
The Netherlands applies to orphan drug sponsors the same beneﬁts accruing to companies that foster and use any type of high
technological research. EMEA Report, supra note 59, at 39-40.
68Id. at 26.Cf. supra note 37.
13with speciﬁc grants for orphan drug R&D. Nevertheless, Article 9 of the Regulation 141/2000 makes clear
that designated medicinal products shall be “eligible for incentives made available by the Community [...]
to support research into, and the development and availability of, orphan medicinal products and in par-
ticular aid for research for small- and medium-sized undertakings provided for in framework programs for
research and technological development”. Summing up, orphan drug research has a priority consideration
by general EU R&D funding plans, but lacks any equivalent, at least at the Community level, to the FDA
comprehensive grant program.
The European regulators decided to include among the set of incentives trying to promote the availability
of orphan medicinal products an expedited access to the centralized marketing authorization procedure69.
However, this purported “fast track” approval has not been able to keep the system from suﬀering what
commentators term “regulatory lag”, that is, the existence of a signiﬁcant lapse of time between designation
and market approval.
The EU regulatory framework is complemented by the initiatives implemented by the 15 member States,
which have been appearing since Regulation 141/2000 and even before70. Most of these measures have been
for the most part either the above-mentioned tax credits or the reduction of fees required through various
administrative procedures. Some countries have also adopted rapid authorization mechanisms similar to
those set out at the Community level (e.g. Germany). In 2001, the Direction General Enterprise of the
European Commission published an Inventory with all the measures adopted at both European and national
levels on orphan medicinal products, thereby fulﬁlling the requirement of Article 9.3, which required the
Commission to take such action71.
3.
69Recall that there are also partial exemptions for paying the fees associated with the entire marketing process. Cooke, supra
note 48, 15. Article 7 of the Regulation 141/2000 exempts designated orphan drugs from demonstrating that they comply with
all the requirements laid down by Annex to Regulation (EEC) 2309/93. However, as Cooke points out, “in most cases an orphan
medicinal product will indeed meet the criteria set out in that Annex, either because it has been produced by biotechnology
[...] or because the medicinal product is regarded as being of “signiﬁcant therapeutic importance”. Cooke, supra note 48, at
15.
70As of April 2003, all 15 Member States, with the only exceptions of Greece and Luxembourg have applied some sort of
complementary incentives to the ones laid down at the Community level. EMEA Report, supra note 59, at 39-40.
71DG Enterprise, Inventory of Community and National Incentive Measures to Aid the Research, Marketing, Development
and Availability of Orphan Medicinal Products, released on June 1st 2001 and periodically reviewed. Last version can be found
at <http://pharmacos.eudra.org/F2/orphanmp/doc/inventory/Inventory-en.pdf>.
14How Well Is the System Working? The Need for Avoiding Self-
indulgence.
The US Orphan Drug Act has 20 years of successful experience. Since it came into force in 1983, 1305
designations have been issued, from which 250 resulted in ﬁnal marketing authorizations by the FDA72.
This data may be compared with the 58 drugs that would have qualiﬁed for orphan status in the 17 years
before the Act was passed73. Moreover, not less than 9 million American patients have beneﬁted from the
availability of these remedies throughout the period of implementation of the orphan drug laws74. All these
numbers have triggered a highly positive opinion amongst patient organizations, professionals and legislators.
Indeed, the pharmaceutical industry progressively abandoned its initial lack of enthusiasm from the moment
the 1984 Amendments were passed75.
The American experience also produced some indirect beneﬁts. The set of incentives laid down in the Orphan
Drug Act has proven to be specially advantageous for the biotechnology industry in general and research and
development in particular. Biotechs often resort to venture capitalists in order to ﬁnance their investment,
and the monopoly proﬁts coupled with market exclusivity rights appear to provide great incentives for such
a ﬁnancing, particularly in view of the fact that patent protection for biotechnological products is cloaked
in uncertainty76. In fact, from 1983 to 1992 19% of all orphan drug approvals went to biotech companies,
and by 2001 this numbers had increased to 41%77. Indeed, most of these sponsors are small or medium-
size companies that pop up into the market precisely because of the public incentives of the Orphan Drug
legislation.
A major second indirect eﬀect of the orphan drug incentives is the introduction into the market of cer-
tain medicinal products designed for rare diseases but also working on some other common ailments. For
instance, the controversial human growth hormone (hGH)78 developed by Genentech to treat an speciﬁc
72These data were drawn from the FDA web page at <http://www.fda.gov/orphan/designat/list.htm> (last accessed:
March 1st 2004).
73Milne et al., supra note 11, at 11.
74Haﬀner, supra note 28, at 40.
75For a somehow critical view on the Orphan Drug Act and its alleged uncertainty under the producers’ perspective, cf.
Robert A. Bohrer & John T. Prince, A Tale of Two Proteins: The FDA’s Uncertain Interpretation of the Orphan Drug Act,
12 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 365, 379-383.
76Milne et al., supra note 11, at 8-9.
77Maeder, supra note 1, at 84-85, citing an study by the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development.
78The human growth hormone is one of the most cited examples of the so-called “orphan blockbusters”, that is, orphan
drugs that have generated huge beneﬁts for its sponsors, therefore calling into question the soundness of their designation. Cf.
Subsection 4.1.
15growth disorder on children, hypopituitary dwarﬁsm, has proven to be also eﬀective in treating other growth
problems79.
The overwhelmingly optimistic assessment of orphan drug legislation is also present on the other side of the
ocean. Despite the short period of implementation of the European legal framework, almost four years80, the
considerable amount of work EMEA and COMP have had to tackle during this period is a good indicator of
initial success of the EU policy on the ﬁeld of orphan medicinal products. Today, the number of designated
products is 185, according to the Community Register of Orphan Medicinal Products for Human Use81. Close
to 250 applications had been received by April 2003 (two-thirds successful), and 32 marketing authorizations
had been requested by then, of which 8 resulted in a marketing authorization82. Even though the data on
ﬁnal availability to the patients are still scarce, authorized voices have expressed their satisfaction with how
the system is working 83.
All active substances approved to be marketed in the US by the FDA were reviewed by the Community
authorities in order to determine the possible pre-existence of a marketing authorization in the EU territory
even before orphan status became available. The results revealed that 85% of orphan products available
in the United States due to the incentives oﬀered by the orphan drugs had also been marketed within the
Community via either the EU centralized procedure or, in most cases, the national authorities and the mutual
recognition system84. Indeed, up to ﬁve applications for marketing authorization through the centralized
procedure were withdrawn during the evaluation phase. Nevertheless, these numbers may be misleading:
only a quarter of the products subject to mutual recognition have received market authorization in all of the
15 member states, and thus the orphan medicinal products available in practice to all EU patients amount
approximately to 50% of the total number of drugs from which their American counterparts beneﬁt85.
Therefore, the orphan drug laws in Europe have a long way to go, even if some progress had been made
79Bohrer & Prince, supra note 75, at 381.
80The ﬁrst appointed COMP began to work in April 17th 2000. EMEA Report, supra note 59, at 2.
81Cf. <http://pharmacos.eudra.org/F2/register/orphreg.htm> (last accessed: March 1st 2004). EMEA regularly publishes
press releases informing about the results of the monthly meetings of the COMP, including all the designations made in each
period. These documents may be found at the Agency’s web page, <http://www.emea.eu.int/index/indexh1.htm>.
82EMEA Report, supra note 59, at 2. As of January 2004, 12 orphan medicinal products have been awarded a marketing
authorization. Cf. supra note 81.
83Cf., for instance, the words of Mrs. Grossetˆ ete, Rapporteur for the Regulation on Orphan Medicinal Products at the
European Parliament, and Mr. Torrent-Farnell, Head of the COMP in Id. at 9-10. However, as the very Report points out
“[...] in spite of these encouraging results, it is yet to early to estimate what percentage of the designated medicines will
eventually receive a market authorization”. Id. at 11.
84Id. at 35.
85Id. at 35.
16before they came into force.
Similarly, the EU orphan drug laws are considered to have a special impact on the biotechnological industry
and small and medium-sized companies with a limited portfolio of products86. However, assessing the eﬀects
of orphan drug regulations on R&D activities and the development of the European industry generally seems
to be a pending task. Yet, the biotech sector in Europe has grown considerably during the last decade, and
this trend became accentuated in the period 2000-2001 (ﬁrst year of implementation of the European orphan
drug regulations), where the biopharmaceutical R&D expenditure shifted from ¨ A4,977 million to ¨ A8,35487.
Despite these encouraging results, again it seems that Europe has a lot of work to do in order to catch up
with its American competitor (¨ A17,522 in 2001)88.
In conclusion, the empirical data point out that the orphan drug policies have proved to be an important
boost for the treatment of rare diseases and, more generally, for the economic and scientiﬁc development of
the pharmaceutical industry. However, it is necessary to avoid any and all forms of self indulgence. Since
the initial steps of such policies in the US during the early 80s, sharp attacks have arisen from many sectors
criticizing certain points embodied in the Orphan Drug Act and its ancillary regulations. These viewpoints
have been reﬂected in the many attempts for reform that have taken place and also in the passage of the
European legal architecture. A good global assessment of the American orphan drug policy, consistent with
the thesis proposed in this paper, was made in 1995:
“The cumulative eﬀect of these provisions is that the Orphan Drug Act has been a clear, although not
unqualiﬁed success. Only ten orphan drugs had reached the market in the ten years prior to its enactment.
Comparatively, in the ten years following passage of the Act, eighty-seven orphans reached commercialization.
[...]In 1990, PMA member companies spent $543 million on orphan drug research. Thus, the evidence
indicates that the Act has succeeded in stimulating substantial commercial investment”89.
In conclusion, there is empirical data which points to both an overwhelmingly positive evaluation of the
American long-standing experience and a hopeful kick oﬀ for the recently-born European initiative. However,
86Small and medium enterprises represent two-thirds of the total number of sponsors. Id. at 18.
87Data drawn from the web page of “Emerging Biopharmaceutical Enterprises”, an organization representing the biophar-
maceutical industry in Europe, at <http://www.ebe-efpia.org/biotech.htm>.
88Id.
89Janice Marchiafava Hogan, Revamping the Orphan Drug Act: Potential Impact on the World Pharmaceutical Market, 26
Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 523, 530 (1995).
17it may not be denied that there is a widespread feeling that present provisions can be ameliorated to correct
some of the deﬁciencies detected throughout the last twenty years, curbing some stunning abuses, clarifying
a few obscure provisions and providing solutions for some challenges which have not been paid enough
attention to.
4.
Addressing Critiques. Main Concerns in Light of the American
Experience and their Responses in the European legislation.
Despite the widely-shared positive assessment on the role played by Orphan Drug regulations towards a
greater availability of this category of drugs, even during the Congressional hearings that preceded the
Orphan Drug Act of 1983 and repeatedly since then many voices criticizing some points of the letter of the
law and several of its practical outcomes have been heard. The myriad of Congressional attempts for reform
that have been taking place since 1983, whether successful or not, are direct evidence of this dissatisfaction.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have insisted on the argument that the Act does not provide the degree of
certainty required to achieve its full potential for innovation (e.g. about the deﬁnition of “sameness” as
applied to competing products) 90. On the other side of the arena , patients and their advocates sharply
criticize the eﬀect of the Orphan Drug Act on prices and industry proﬁts91.
This Section will discuss the most notorious points of controversy. Indeed, there are other issues raised by
interested parties and scholars92, but this paper will concentrate only on those which have been object of
serious public debate and which had some impact in Europe when the 2000 Regulations were enacted. The
purpose is to scrutinize each criticism and its repercussion in the United States, analyzing the normative
solutions that have been proposed, and ﬁnally, to take note of what European authorities have done.
4.1.
90Clissold, supra note 10, at 131.
91Id. at 131.
92A good example of the latter is the purported unconstitutionality of the Oprhan Drug Act asserted by John Flynn. Cf.
generally John Flynn, The Orphan Drug Act: an Unconstitutional Exercise of the Patent Power 1992 Utah L. Rev. 389 (1992).
This author maintains that Congress is not constitutionally empowered to grant a patent-like right, evading in an irregular
manner the patent clause embodied in the US Constitution, so long as many of the protected orphan drugs are already known
to be eﬀective and may not qualify as “discoveries”, as required by such clause. Other commentators claim that alternative,
constitutionally-consistent interpretations are possible. Cf. Pulsinelli, supra note 5, at 338-339.
18The Risk of Abuse: Orphan Blockbusters.
Without a doubt, the largest concern by far that commentators and legislators have detected in the American
orphan drug regulatory framework arises from the factual evidence that some medicinal products designated
as “orphans” and therefore beneﬁting from the incentives embodied in the orphan drug laws (most notably,
from market exclusivity rights), have produced such enormous beneﬁts for their sponsors that they have called
into question their own status as orphan drugs and the entire legal architecture93. These drugs fulﬁlled all the
statutory requirements under the Orphan Drug Act, obtained a designation and subsequently a marketing
authorization; but their sponsors have reaped considerable beneﬁts in some cases recovering the development
costs in the ﬁrst couple of years since initial access to the market. Think for example on orphan drugs that
must be administered to chronic patients during a prolonged lapse of time or even their entire lives, or on
remedies for infectious ailments that are spreading rapidly.
The inﬂuence of market exclusivity rights on the existence of these “blockbuster drugs” is evident: the
7-period protection curbs any actual or potential competition for the designated drug, enabling the sponsor
to charge monopoly prices for the drug. However, it must be noted that this is precisely the very intent
of the Act: to oﬀer a monopolistic position to encourage the industry to develop products that would not
be otherwise manufactured94. Therefore, these cases can be deﬁned as “abuses” of the actual statutory
protection, as situations where the letter of the law goes beyond its purpose by aﬀording protection to
orphans that already have parents willing to take care of them. A good example, cited by many authors, is
Ceredase, a remedy for Glaucher’s disease, which aﬄicts around 2,000 Americans95. Genzyme, the biotech
sponsor has been accused of taking advantage of the monopoly position in the US under the orphan drug
legislation to earn close to half a billion dollars a year by charging patients between $100,000 and $400,000
annually for their treatment, depending on whether the person is a child or an adult96.
The core objective here is striking a balance between encouraging innovation and avoiding monopoly prices
during the temporary protection aﬀorded by market exclusivity rights. Some have argued that this a is an
93Pulsinelli states that “the commentary all focuses on essentially the same four or ﬁve drugs: AZT(HIV infection/AIDS);
pentamidine isethionate (pneumonia associated with AIDS); human growth hormone (hGH) (improper growth in children
lacking the enzyme), erythropoietin (EPO) (anemia associated with end-stage renal disease); and Ceredase TM (Glaucher’s
disease)”. Pulsinelli, supra note 5, at 316-317.
94Id. at 318.
95Maeder, supra note 1, at 85-86.
96Id. at 86. Maeder talks about Ceredase as the “world’s most expensive medicine”.
19“all or nothing” debate, a ﬂat choice between having expensive drugs or not having them at all and therefore
letting patients down97. However, the problem happens to be a little more complex, as the many attempts
for statutory reform speciﬁcally addressing this issue plainly show; and today there exists a wide-spread
consensus favoring a legislative reform that may curb these scarce (about 10% of the total number of orphan
drugs approach this blockbuster status98) but nevertheless disturbing abuses.
A main second problem associated with the phenomenon of proﬁtable orphans is the situation of ﬁrms racing
each other for obtaining designation and thus a monopoly position in the market. Pulsinelli has detected
two main diﬃculties arising from this observable fact. First, the very idea of a race questions the “orphan
status” of these products, provided that “true orphans” hardly ever may attract the attention of more than
one parent. As Pulsinelli puts it, “the fact that ﬁrms are ﬁghting over these drugs suggests that in fact they
are likely to be proﬁtable, and hence it is an abuse of the orphan drug incentives if they are applied to these
drugs”99. Second, such a race does not produce anything but a waste of resources, specially on the part of
the loser, since its investment will not receive any sort of reward100.
But the so-called “orphan blockbuster” is not only explained by the monopoly conferred by market exclu-
sivity. Experts have also pointed to “expanding orphan diseases” as the other leading cause of proﬁtable
orphan drugs101, that is, to indications that aﬀect less than 200,000 people in the US at the time the drug is
designated, but that later on surpass that population. Undoubtedly, the paradigm here is AIDS. Many of the
initial remedies for HIV infection and the diseases related to it were awarded protection under the orphan
drug law, but have subsequently happened to be extremely proﬁtable, as the infection has spread out and
the potential market has grown102. Full-blown AIDS surpassed the 200,000 patients cap in 1993 and many
of the opportunistic diseases can no longer be considered for orphan designation103, but the same problem
might arise with any other illness. In other cases, orphan drugs have become blockbusters through their use
for oﬀ-label indications, i.e. indications other than those studied under the clinical trials and laid down in
97Pulsinelli, supra note 5, at 318-319.
98Sheila R. Schulman et al., Implementation of the Orphan Drug Act: 1983-1991, 47 Food & Drug L.J. 363, 402 (1992).
99Pulsinelli, supra note 5, at 320.
100Id. at 321. This second problem
101Id. at 323. Cf. also Clissold, supra note 10, at 133-134.
102AZT is probably the best example of this kind of proﬁtable orphans. AZT is part of the initial treatments against full-blown
AIDS, when this ailment broke out. AZT was awarded marketing approval in 1989 for the treatment of an estimated population
of 45,000 people. Shortly after, it was demonstrated that the drug also was eﬀective for delaying the appearance of full-blown
AIDS, and therefore the potential number of users was increased by the 600,000 asymptomatic HIV carriers existing at that
time. David D. Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: an Engine of Innovation? At What Cost? 55 Food & Drug L.J. 125, 135 (2000)
103Pulsinelli, supra note 5, at 323.
20the FDA approval104. This phenomenon occurs because physicians are authorized under their discretion to
prescribe medicines for conditions not included in the label of the product, therefore expanding the possible
uses of the particular drug and, as a consequence, also its proﬁt margins105.
Once the problem of blockbuster drugs has been described, it is time to examine the actual and prospective
solutions that may address it106. It must be noted that several amendments to the Orphan Drug Act can
well be explained by the overwhelming concerns with the above-mentioned abuses, and that none of these
reforms achieved signiﬁcant success.
The ﬁrst of the initiatives that have been proposed to curb abuses, and perhaps the most popular, is the so
called “shared exclusivity.” This proposal was underlying the reform initiatives presented in 1986, 1987 and
1990107, and it basically consists on an authorization for sharing market exclusivity between two or more
sponsors that have developed their products “simultaneously,” i.e., during an approximately coincident
period of time. Obviously, this sort of proposals have been strongly opposed by the industry, since successful
companies would be forced to divide up the beneﬁts reaped once the products are on the market, and that
allegedly would disturb the initial ﬁnancial risk assessment that producers make when deciding whether to
begin to develop a drug or not108. However, cross-licensing agreements, joint ventures and other sorts of
collaborative schemes have been used by industry members to minimize the risk of the investment109. In
104Clissold, supra note 10, at 134-135.
105Pulsinelli does not share the kinds of concerns pertaining to the oﬀ-label use of orphan drugs. He argues that oﬀ-label use
does in fact increase competition, and that if the oﬀ-label market is attractive enough, other companies would seek approval
for drugs speciﬁcally addressing these indications. Pulsinelli, supra note 5, at 339-340.
106As for the actual solutions, the supporters of the actual version of the Orphan Drug Act (mainly the industry) tend to cite
the formal or informal programs put in place by most pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies for providing indigent
patients with free drugs and the parallel public initiatives on the ﬁeld. Maeder, supra note 1, at 86-87. However, even accepting
the statement that no one with a rare disease has been unable to obtain a designated orphan drug because of ﬁnancial causes,
this does not solve the root of the problem: that some companies are reaping huge beneﬁts in part due to the abuse from a
protective legislation, and that ﬁnal consumers are paying artiﬁcially high prices.
107In 1986, the concept of shared exclusivity was introduced for the ﬁrst time in a reform proposal to allow sharing exclusivity
rights among drugs that were developed “simultaneously”. The proposal introduced in 1987 was limited to generic drugs.
In 1990, the ﬁnal version of the amendment established some more strict requirements to deﬁne “simultaneous” development
through diﬀerent types of time limits in order to assure that the development of the product was in fact “simultaneous”.
However, as it was mentioned, the 1990 Amendment was pocket-vetoed by President George H. Bush. The Orphan Drug
Amendment of 1994 reintroduced the same provisions of its predecessor, but Congress did not approve the initiative.
108Pulsinelli, supra note 5, at 329. Pulsinelli generally aligns with the industry positions and rejects the introduction of shared
exclusivity concluding that “[...] while a change in the Orphan Drug Act to allow shared exclusivity might enhance cooperation
and seem more ’fair’ to losers, the severe damage to the Act’s incentives and the enormously increased administration costs
weigh against enacting such change”. Pulsinelli, supra note 5, at 331.
109Clissold, supra note 10, at 134-135. Clissold cites a study by Schulman (cf. supra note 98) which describes that 69 joint
ventures or licensing agreements have taken place recently, even though 83% of orphan products remain to be sponsored by a
single company.
21fact, joint eﬀorts seem to be a good option for supporting innovation in the ﬁeld of orphan drugs, since they
would help to solve some of the structural diﬃculties that sponsors face when dealing with orphan drugs
(limited patient population and the like), thus increasing eﬃciency all across the industry110.
The second main initiative proposed in the United States has been the reduction of the market exclusivity
term111. Actually, this period is seven years, but some proposals for statutory amendments have tried to
abbreviate this period substantially. For instance, the 1992 Amendments established a sales cap of $200
million. The exclusivity right was awarded for two years and after that time and over the next seven years,
the exclusivity term could be revoked if the sales threshold was surpassed. In a parallel fashion, the 1994
Amendments put forward a new period of four years, extendable for three extra years if the sponsor was
able to show that it was a drug of “limited commercial potential”112. The problems that commentators
have found with these limitations are analogous to those arising from the initial version of the statute, which
asked producers to provide certain sensitive and often unveriﬁable data113. However, note that the data here
refer to the past (actual sales volume) and not to the future (expected beneﬁts).
The third recognized initiative that should be examined is the revocation of exclusivity rights once a gen-
erating event takes place. In normal conditions, this “event” is the achievement of a certain level of sales
or proﬁts, and normally the former option is preferred, so long as sales numbers are more easy to ascertain
and less awkward for the industry114. On the other hand, they are also “much less accurate”115, since the
development costs and other factors inﬂuencing the ﬁnal result from an investment vary widely across the
industry. Nevertheless, the 1992 Amendments followed the path of establishing a sales level of $200 million
as the situation that would automatically lead to a revocation of the exclusivity status. An alternative for
this “trigger” event is an increase in the number of patients that surpasses the cap of 200,000 Americans,
and this was the option taken by the 1990 Amendments116. From all the solutions to address the issue of
orphan proﬁtability, revocation of exclusive marketing rights appears to be the one with a wider consensus in
its support117, so long as it is perhaps the less aggressive initiative and the one that happens to respect the
110Id. at 145.
111Pulsinelli, supra note 5, at 332.
112Cf. 140 Cong. Rec. S3684, S3728 (daily ed. March 24, 1994) (statement of Senator Kassebaum discussing the provisions
of the Orphan Drug Act Amendments of 1994).




117Even Pulsinelli acknowledges that “these provisions seem to be reasonable enough”. Id. at 335. The National Organization
22initial structure of incentives to a higher degree. In any event, the bright-line rule based on the prevalence
of the disease is called into question and suﬀers criticism for being an inadequate proxy for unproﬁtability.
Revocation appears then as a sound mechanism for relaxing the rule and bringing it closer to reality.
Fourth and last, authors tend to mention among the measures that have been often proposed during the
20 years of orphan drug regulatory experience in the United States the creation of a windfall proﬁt tax
on all proﬁts accruing from the marketing of orphan drugs above a given threshold118. Through diﬀerent
versions, the same scheme has been presented in Congress in 1990, 1991 and 1993 by Representative Stark
from California119. The main idea is to tax beneﬁts from an amount of revenues equal to the production
costs plus, in some cases, a certain volume. Again, the main alleged pitfall of the proposal is the disclosure
obligations that imposes to the industry120; but it seems hard to distinguish these duties from other imposed
under various other tax laws.
From what was described so far, one conclusion appears to be clear: it is necessary to strike a new balance
between innovation encouragement and industry proﬁt and pricing, between incentives and competition.
Both over- and underprotection are equally bad for patients and society as a whole, which should be the
primary beneﬁciaries of the law. Even though the cases of abuse are not numerous, action should be taken
to address this particular issue amending the Orphan Drug Act to include some of the measures described
above. In particular, the revocation mechanism may be a very useful tool to curb abuse by the industry,
and this is what the European legislators seem to had in mind when they enacted Regulation 141/2000.
In the European Union, the concern about possible abusive practices by the industry was present since
the initial steps of the EU orphan medicinal product legislation121, and this concern was echoed in some
provisions of the Regulation 1441/2000 cited above. First, the Regulation ﬁnally chose a epidemiological
criterion to deﬁne the concept of “orphan drug”, by setting up a prevalence ratio of less than 5/10,000 people,
lower than the one established in the US (approximately 7.5/10,000). Thus, the same controversy that has
taken place in the United States about the accurateness of a bright rule as a proxy for nonproﬁtability are
for Rare Disorders (NORD) has clearly expressed its support to a rule like these. Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical
Regulation in the United States 14 J. Legal Med. 617, 636 (1993).
118Pulsinelli, supra note 5, at 335-336.
119Id. at 336.
120Id. at 336.
121For instance, the Presentation of the initial Proposal of Regulation (cf. note 40) acknowledges that “some of the medicinal
products designated as orphan drugs in the United States have subsequently proved to be (extremely) proﬁtable”.
23likely to occur in Europe. However, this numerical cap is combined with a more ﬂexible economic test:
an orphan medicinal product may also be designated as such provided the sponsor can show that, without
the incentives provided by this status, development of these medicinal products would not be undertaken.
In sum, the designation criteria open the door to exactly the same source of problems as the US system
witnessed.
As for the duration of the exclusivity privilege, European regulators chose a longer term (10 years, versus 7
in the US), but also included a revocation clause in Article 8 of the Regulation. Under that provision, the
exclusivity period may be reduced to 6 years in the event that, at the end of the ﬁfth year it is established that
the designation criteria (i.e. nonproﬁtability, prevalence of the disease) are no longer met. Consequently, EU
law has been clearly inﬂuenced by the various proposals presented in the US favoring the limitation of the
market exclusivity beneﬁt in certain cases122. In any event, this progress may be oﬀset by the longer duration
of the legal monopoly, and it is still too early to ﬁgure out how it is going to work in practice (will companies
be required to provide COMP or EMEA with data?). So far, the Communication from the Commission
on Regulation 141/2000 vaguely states that “the Commission will put in place the necessary procedures
and systems in order to monitor the prices of orphan medicinal products [...]”, as well as proﬁtability123.
The Communication also recommends that at the end of the ﬁfth year of market exclusivity the competent
authorities “systematically check whether or not the criteria on which basis market exclusivity was granted
are no longer met”124.
As for what was termed above “shared exclusivity”, the EU law has not included any similar provision to
those included in the various unsuccessful Amendments to the US Orphan Drug Law. The wording of article
8.1 of the Regulation is straightforward: neither the Community nor the Member States shall “[...] grant
a marketing authorization for the same therapeutic indication in respect of a similar medicinal product”
unless any of the derogations set out in article 8.3 apply125. Therefore, after one of the products receives
marketing authorization by either procedure, in most cases other applications will be refused unless the new
122Furthermore, in Article 5.12 of the Regulation 141/2000 it is provided a cause of removal from the Community Register of
Orphan Medicinal Products that refers to the fact that “the criteria laid down in Article 3 [designation criteria] are no longer
met in respect of the medicinal product concerned”. This clause may be characterize as a sort of market exclusivity revocation
even before this period starts, or as a reevaluation by the COMP of the designation requisites.
123Communication from the Commission on Regulation (EC) no.141/2000 on orphan medicinal products, supra note 49, at
10.
124Id. at 10.
125Article 8.3 embodies the following situations: a) consent of the initial sponsor, b) initial sponsor unable to supply suﬃcient
quantities to meet the demand, and c) clinical superiority.
24applicants may prove that the second product is safer, more eﬀective or “otherwise clinically superior”, in
parallel to what happens in the US. This issue will be revisited in Subsection 4.2.
Finally, the alternative of the windfall proﬁt tax was not even considered under the EU regulations, due to
the fact that, as we described in Section 3, the Community is barred from establishing any tax system under
the current versions of the Treaties. Again, this topic will be considered in Subsection 4.7 when referring to
some particular features and limitations of the European legal framework.
As a brief conclusion, the European orphan drug law has made some progress in light of the experience gained
in the US during the last 20 years and the criticisms raised in this country. However, the innovation has
not been substantial and how the revocation clause will be applied by the Community authorities remains
uncertain. Therefore, some of the debates that are actually going on in the US are likely to be echoed on
the other side of the Atlantic in the near future.
4.2.
Clarifying Ambiguities: the “Same Versus Diﬀerent” and
“Clinical Superiority” Problems.
The second of the main problems revealed by the American experience with the regulation of orphan drugs
consists of the ambiguities that the Orphan Drug Act presents in deﬁning the boundaries of the market
exclusivity protection. This issue was traditionally termed as the “same versus diﬀerent” problem126. Ini-
tially, neither the Act nor other regulations encompassed any provision establishing when a posterior drug
was the “same” as the pioneer drug and hence barred form being introduced into the market to compete
with the initial remedy127. Once a designated orphan drug was awarded marketing approval, all “same”
medicinal products were not eligible to be commercialized. However, the lack of deﬁnition for “sameness”
lead to important controversies, among which the case of the human growth hormone (hGH) is frequently
cited as an illustration by commentators128. Genentech Inc. had developed Protropin, a recombinant human
growth hormone to treat the deﬁciency of such hormones, receiving marketing authorization by the FDA in
126For a detailed study addressing this topic more deeply than the aim of this essay intends to do, cf. generally, Bohrer &
Prince, supra note 75.
127Clissold, supra note 10, at 131.
128Cf. for instance, Rohde, supra note 19, at 133-134.
25October 1985129. Subsequently, Eli Lilly & Co. requested approval for introducing its own hGH product,
Humatrope, in the market in June 1986. Genentech went to the court seeking temporary injunctive relief
to prevent its competitor from getting FDA approval, claiming that Humatrope was the “same product” as
Protropin. The District Court refused to decide the case, setting no general rule for determining when two
drugs must be considered to be the “same” product or “diﬀerent” ones under the Orphan Drug Act, and
instead declared that such duty is statutorily imposed on the FDA130. However, FDA subsequently granted
marketing approval for Humatrope, and from that moment and until the 1993 Regulations, has decided this
type of incidents on a case-by-case basis.
The remedy to the lack of legal standards came with the 1993 Regulations. The ﬁnal option adopted
by FDA was based on the so-called “structural similarity” criterion, distinguishing between macro- and
micromolecular drugs. For the former, if both compounds have only “minor” diﬀerences in aminoacid
sequence, there are considered to be the same product131. The latter drugs are presumed to be the same if
the “active moiety” is identical between both132. In both cases, the presumption can be rebutted if the second
sponsor eﬀectively demonstrates that its orphan is “clinically superior”, which entitles the drug to receive
marketing authorization as well. The deﬁnitions laid down in the Regulations refer to “clinical superiority”
as the situation where “a drug is shown to provide a signiﬁcant therapeutic advantage over and above that
provided by an approved orphan drug (...)”. This advantage may consist on greater eﬀectiveness, higher
levels of safety or any other “major contribution to patient care”133, and the burden of proving it is borne
by the second sponsor134. The “same versus diﬀerent” problem was therefore at least partially solved by the
signiﬁcant certainty added to the statutory framework by the FDA regulations and the risk of “free riding”
(purportedly caused by one ﬁrm introducing cosmetic changes in the structure of a previously marketed
drug and claiming that the new compound is a “diﬀerent” one) was ruled out as well135. However, a recent
129Clisssold, supra note 10, at 131-132.
130Id. at 132. The case reference is Genentech Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301 (D.D.C. 1987).
131Id. at 137. Large molecular drugs tend to be biotechnological products.
132“Active moiety” is deﬁned in §316.3(b)(2) of the Regulations as “the molecule or ion, excluding those appended portions
of the molecule that cause de drug to be an ester, salt (...), or other noncovalent derivative (...) of the molecule, responsible
for the physiological or pharmacological action of the drug substance”.
133§316.3(b)(3) of the 1993 Regulations. The expression “major contribution to patient care” must be understood narrowly,
and the other variables are easily ascertainable through comparing clinical trials. Haﬀner, Orphan Products, Ten Years Later
and Then Some 49 Food & Drug L.J. 593, 599 (1994). The only example given by the FDA as a “major contribution to patient
care” was the development of an oral dosage where only a parenteral option had been available previously. Joseph A. Levitt &
John V. Kelsey, The Orphan Drug Regulations and Related Issues, 48 Food & Drug L.J. 525, 529 (1993).
134Some commentators have posed the question of whether a lower price might qualify as a “major contribution to patient
care”, but this idea deserves immediate rejection, since considerations about prices fall well beyond the mandate of the FDA
Id. at 528.
135However, Pulsinelli mentions a recent case; Berlex Lab. Inc. v. FDA, 942 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1996), where the application
26publication criticized the fact that “the standards used [in the US] to judge superiority are less than clear”,
leaving the agency with too much discretion to make such ﬁnding136.
The marketing exclusivity rights that any orphan drug enjoys may therefore only be disturbed by an identical
product (deﬁned in terms of their composition) if the latter triggers some kind of beneﬁt that the former
lacked. The approach taken in Europe resembles this model substantially. As described above, article
8.3(c) of the Regulation 141/2000 makes an exception to market exclusivity when a second similar medicinal
product may be shown to be “safer, more eﬀective or otherwise clinically superior”. The parallelism with
the FDA Regulations is obvious. The concepts of “similar medicinal product” and “clinical superiority” are
detailed by Regulation 847/2000, which encompasses deﬁnitions strikingly similar to those of the American
orphan drug law. “Similarity” is deﬁned by the existence of a “similar active substance”137 in both products,
that is, “an identical active substance, or an active substance with the same principal molecular structural
features (but not necessarily all of the same molecular structural features) and which acts via the same
mechanism”, according to the relevant statutory provisions138. The imitation of the wording of its American
counterpart continues when Regulation 847/2000 addresses the characterization of clinical superiority. As
article 8.3(d) provides, a medicinal product is clinically superior when it oﬀers “a signiﬁcant therapeutic or
diagnostic advantage over and above that provided by an authorized orphan medicinal product”, i.e., greater
eﬃciency, greater safety or any other “major contribution to diagnosis or to patient care”139. In sum, if
there is an area in which the European orphan drug law can be deemed as a mere copy of its American elder
brother, it will be that involving the so called “similar versus diﬀerent” problem. Therefore, the same issues
of vagueness described above apply in both jurisdictions, although great progress was made when the 1993
FDA Regulations were issued.
4.3.
of the notion of “clinical superiority” by the Agency lead to litigation challenging it. The Court upheld the FDA position on
the merits after using a very deferential standard for reviewing this type of decisions.
136Brian Reid, New Products Highlight Ambiguity of Orphan Drug Law 21 Nature Biotechnology 6, 6-7 (2003). The example
used by the author is the struggle between Fabrazyme (from Genzyme General) and Replagal (fron Transkaryotic Therapies),
two drugs designed to treat Fabry disease, a lethal and uncommon liposomal storage disorder.
137“Active substance” must be understood to mean “a substance with physiological or pharmacological activity”, according
to Article 3.3(a) of the Regulation 847/2000.
138Article 3.3(c) of the Regulation 847/2000. These provision also contains speciﬁc, explanatory examples of similar active
substances.
139This third way of clinical superiority applies only, as the text of the article makes clear, “in exceptional cases”. The meaning
of this wording is obviously far from clear.
27Salami Slicing: “Creative” Subsets and their Remedy.
The term “salami slicing” refers to the practice used by many applicants trying to deﬁne one stage or man-
ifestation of a particular disease as a diﬀerentiated condition entitled to protection under the orphan drug
laws so long as the designation criteria (most signiﬁcantly, the prevalence threshold) are met140. This sort
of “trick” takes advantage from the fact that the FDA permits sponsors to parse diseases into “medically
plausible subsets”141, and often involves complicated debates within the scientiﬁc community over terminol-
ogy and the bounds of medical deﬁnitions. Through this tool, companies could obtain market exclusivity
and all the other statutory beneﬁts and incentives for multiple indications that together may exceed 200,000
people, getting rid of the bright-line rule based on prevalence.
The “salami slicing” problem was speciﬁcally addressed by the 1993 Regulations142. Under these norms, the
Oﬃce of Orphan Products Development (OPD) at the FDA must examine each orphan drug application in
order to make clear that the declared patient population is not an “arbitrary subset” of the actual number
of people aﬄicted by the disease at the time the request for designation is made. The test laid down in
§316.21(b) of the Regulations is based on the concept of “medical plausibility”: any targeted population
that happens to be medically implausible would be automatically considered as an “arbitrary subset” of the
real condition and the application would be rejected on these grounds143. For instance, using the example
put forward by Haﬀner, “arbitrarily deﬁning end-stage cancer as a subgroup would not be acceptable if the
drug can be used in a broader cross-section of patients”144.
The OPD has outlined a set of principles to be applied when assessing patient population claims under
the “medical plausibility” standard. Hence, the OPD will consider the basic pathologic process as the
condition entity, unless there are special circumstances playing against this rule (location, age group or special
regulatory requirements), and chronic diseases that evolve with time will be deemed to be the same ailment for
designation purposes145. It must be noted that even Marlene Haﬀner (Director of the OPD) acknowledges
that “any system used to deﬁne ’medically plausible’ will appear subjective to some observers, since the
140Maeder, supra note 1, at 87. This arbitrary subdivision is very common in cases involving cancer, where companies try to
pick the rarest subcategory they can ﬁgure out in order to meet the 200,000 patient population requirement. Margolis, supra
note 1, at 21.
141Maeder, supra note 1 at 87.
142Cf. supra note 25.
143Clissold, supra note 10, at 137.
144Haﬀner, supra note 133, at 596.
145Id. at 597.
28process is not clearly deﬁned by law”146. However, this situation can be considered to be unavoidable,
since the distinctions on the boundaries may be blurred and indeed there may exist scientiﬁc controversy
on how to deﬁne a particular disease or condition. Notwithstanding, regulators should try to set up clear
and unambiguous rules that at the same time may promote certainty and contribute to curb any abuse by
industry. Both the 1993 Regulations in the United States and the EU Commission Regulation 847/2000
point in this direction.
In the European Union, the Regulation 141/2000 deferred the implementation of the designation criteria laid
down in article 3.1 to the subsequent Commission Regulation 847/2000, which in turn establishes speciﬁc rules
to assure that the prevalence claims are accurate and in check with reality. Article 2 of Regulation 847/2000
forces sponsors to provide documentation that include “appended authoritative references which demonstrate
that the disease or condition for which the medicinal product would be administered, aﬀects not more than
ﬁve in 10,000 persons in the Community at the time at which the application for designation is submitted,
where these are available”. The text continues requiring that such documentation must encompass or refer
to “relevant scientiﬁc literature” and “relevant databases” existing in the Community or third countries.
This wording may be interpreted to call for suﬃcient explanation of the medical plausibility of the patient
population targeted, and of course COMP will exert a complete review of the application, obviously including
the rightfulness of the disease deﬁnition. The EMEA Report cited in Chapter 3.3147 mentions a document
produced by COMP entitled “Points to Consider on the Calculation and Reporting of Prevalence of a
Condition for Orphan Designation”, where the issue of preventing “salami slicing” is addressed. However,
the EMEA Report itself recommends a deeper deﬁnition of what would constitute a “valid subset” “with valid
and unambiguous examples that may help sponsors to prepare their applications and bring more objectivity
into the procedure148.
4.4.
High Prices: the Undesired Eﬀects of Monopoly on Reim-
bursement Policies.
The pricing problem described in Subsection 4.1. has immediate repercussions on the cost of public and
146Id. at 597-598.
147EMEA Report, supra note 59, at 22-23.
148Id. at 23.
29private health care systems all over the world. Since the actual letter of the law does not eﬀectively curb any
abuse by companies, high prices severely harm families that lack health insurance or that have lower lifetime
caps or unaﬀordably high premiums in their plans149. Besides, the problem concerns public budgetary
appropriations in public health coverage programs such as Medicare and Medicaid in the US or other more
extensive Social Security systems, like those operating in most of the EU members. For instance, Medicare
spent only in Epogen under its renal dialysis program around $100 million in 1990150. Also countries with
price controls over medicinal products (almost all western countries with the only exception of the United
States), face serious challenges as a consequence of highly-priced drugs, since their negotiation position is
seriously compromised by having to deal with a legal monopoly151.
Apart from the initiatives devised to avoid excessively proﬁtable orphans, described above, this problem
is only part of the more general pharmaceutical cost dilemma, and must be solved by legislatures and
governments beyond the bounds of speciﬁc orphan drug regulations152. Neither FDA nor EMEA have
any authority over price control. However, some modest contributions can be made from the orphan drug
ﬁeld. NORD, for instance, proposed, among a variety of cost-containment measures, establishing a separate
fund under Medicare to ﬁnance purchase of orphan drugs and mandating the currently voluntary free drug
giveaway programs of pharmaceutical manufacturers153. However, it should be kept in mind that the very
purpose of the US Orphan Drug Act and its market incentives is antithetical with any attempt to control drug
prices. This causes two main dilemmas. First, countries which implement pricing control over medicines are
free riding those which try to promote development by providing, among other incentives, monopoly proﬁts.
This could have been the case of the US, which, as some commentators argue, bears the overwhelming
majority of the drug development costs worldwide because of the lack of government-imposed price caps154.
Second, jurisdictions such as the EU, where both schemes (orphan drug incentives and price limitations) are
put in place might face a deep contradiction, whose solution is not obvious.
149Maeder, supra note 1, at 87. Recall the discussion about the prices of Genzyme’s Ceredase, for instance.
150Hogan, supra note 89, at 532.
151EMEA Report, supra note 59, at 34.
152Maeder, supra note 1, at 87. For a general discussion on prescription drugs in the US, cf. John D. Pinzone, The Aﬀordable
Prescription Drugs Act: a Solution for Today’s High Prescription Drug Prices 16 J.L. & Health 145 (2001-2002).
153Hogan, supra note 89, at 536-537. The author makes clear that these recommendations are “problematic”.
154Id. at 537. As an example, Hogan cites the fact that in 1990, aerosol pentamidine for AIDS retailed for $26 per vial in
Europe, while the price in the US went from $120 to $200. Id. at 538. However, orphan drug prices are even higher in Japan.
Gina M. Cavalier, Pushing Parentless Pharmaceuticals: Toward an International Home for “Orphan Drugs” and a Cure for
“Zebra” Diseases 27 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 447, 458 (1996).
30The problem of the clash between orphan legislation and pharmaceutical cost containment is considerably
larger in the European Union, since each individual member State has its own Social Security and reim-
bursement policies, as well as a price control scheme of its own. In this context, two proposals tending to
harmonization have been suggested. First, EMEA put forward the establishment of some harmonized form
of assessment of therapeutic value and pharmacoeconomic evaluation of each authorized orphan medicinal
product155, which has not been implemented so far. Second and last, Directive 89/105156 attempts to achieve
a greater degree of transparency by requiring national governments to rationally explain any price, proﬁtabil-
ity or reimbursement limits157. However, the above-cited EMEA Report includes in its Annex 5 a study on
the availability and pricing of designated orphan medicinal products in the Community, and its results show
a “wide heterogeneity” of prices amongst the 15 countries158. It appears as evident that the actual eﬀorts
towards homogeneous costs are not enough to achieve the purported goal. Of course, a Community policy
on health care is still far from being even considered by the Union in the short term, but however, a better
coordination and transparency of national policies must be encouraged.
4.5.
The True Orphans: Neglected and Tropical Diseases159.
The pharmaceutical and biotechnological research developments that have taken place over the last three
decades have been basically addressed to cure diseases and conditions whose patients are mostly located in
developed countries, while communicable diseases that are still the main cause of mortality and morbidity
in the tropical countries received only marginal attention160. The causes happen to be pretty obvious:
most eﬀorts by the pharmaceutical industry have been and actually are geared toward diseases that may
be able to generate economic proﬁts (i.e. cardiovascular disorders, cancer and neuro-degenerative disease,
basically)161. However, orphan drug initiatives might arguably constitute an opportunity for these tropical
155EMEA Report, supra note 59, at 15.
156Council Directive 89/105 of 21 December 1988, Relating to the Transparency of Measures Regulating the Pricing of
Medicinal Products for Human Use and their Inclusion in the Scope of National Health Insurance Systems (OJ L 40).
157Hogan, supra note 89, at 553.
158EMEA Report, supra note 59, at 62-66.
160Patrice Trouillier et al., Is Orphan Drug Status Beneﬁcial to Tropical Disease Control? Comparison of the American and
the Future European Orphan Drug Acts Vol. 4, N. 6 Tropical Medicine and Int’l Health, 412, 412 (1999). As an example, of
the approximately 1450 new molecular entities commercialized worldwide between 1972 and 1997, only 13 (less than 1%) were
for tropical diseases. Id. at 413.
161Id. at 412.
31and neglected diseases to obtain an eﬀective cure through research eﬀorts carried in developed countries
and for the mentioned imbalance to be solved162. As, Trouiller puts it, “the present proﬁt-driven system is
unable to keep pace with current and evolving needs in tropical medicine and policies such as those used for
orphan drugs could turn out to be the acceptable dace of disease-driven commerce [...]. When the market
does not provide such treatments, it is the role of society to take appropriate steps”163.
Both the US and the EU regulatory frameworks allow for medicines intended to cure third-world diseases
to qualify for orphan status by limiting the scope of prevalence required among the designation criteria to
either a given ratio or a global number of patients in the United States or in the Community. Thus, ailments
which are uncommon in those territories (below the statutory thresholds to gain orphan designation), but
extremely frequent in other regions of the world, may be eligible for protection under the Orphan Drug Act
or the European Regulations164. Hence, the fact that patient population caps refer only to these areas opens
the door for widespread conditions to be considered “rare diseases” and thereby receive attention by orphan
drug laws165. In fact, some progress has been made in this direction, and FDA has approved as orphan
products drugs treating malaria, leprosy and African sleeping sickness166. The younger European legislation
had the opportunity to include an express reference to neglected diseases, but refused to do so, even though
this issue was addressed throughout the entire legislative process since its very early stages in the 80s167.
Provided that the EU law is almost identical when dealing with designation criteria to that of the US, it
seems that the same modest results achieved by the Orphan Drug Act will be reached by the European
regulation.
However, neither regulatory framework is under current conditions capable of substantially changing the
traditional reluctance by pharmaceutical industries to invest in. Keep in mind that exclusive marketing
protection tends by its own nature to higher prices, and often those will be well beyond of what poor countries
162Take into account, as a useful information to ascertain the magnitude of the disproportion, that there is a 13-fold greater
chance of a drug being commercialized for central-nervous-system disorders or cancer that for a neglected disease. Patrice
Trouillier et al. Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: a Deﬁcient Market and a Public-Health Policy Failure 359 Lancet,
2188 (2002).
163Trouillier et al., supra note 160, at 419.
164The Communication from the Commission on Regulation 1441/2000 on Regulation 141/2000, clearly states that “the
prevalence of the disease or condition outside the Community has no inﬂuence on the interpretation of [the designation criteria]”.
Communication from the Commission, supra note 49, at 2.
165It seems that Congress had this idea in mind when it drafted the Orphan Drug Act in 1983. Pulsinelli, supra note 5, at
343-344.
166Haﬀner, supra note 133, at 600. AIDS drugs (9% of the total orphan drug designations. Milne at al., supra note 11, at 12)
are not taken into account, due to the high prevalence of the HIV infection in developed countries.
167Trouillier et al., supra note 160, at 416-417.
32and their populations can aﬀord. Therefore, some kind of reform is needed to extend the success of orphan
drug laws to patients suﬀering from common diseases in the third world, which represent 90% of the global
burden of disease. Speciﬁc measures such as prioritization or identiﬁcation of diseases considered neglected
among all rare conditions, fast-track regulatory review, preference for grants and subsidies, international
harmonization of regulations or extension and transferability of exclusive marketing rights, are proposed
for amending both the Orphan Drug Act and the European laws168. In Europe, EMEA has expressly
recognized the problem posed by neglected diseases and proposed intervention in the ﬁeld “consistently with
other community action programs in that area”169. A statutory reform is essential to provide these “true
orphans” with adopters.
4.6.
Global Responses: the Need for Coordination.
The pharmaceutical market has become more and more globalized, while the responses from the regulatory
sphere remain basically state-based. In this integrated market, the more than 10,000 pharmaceutical pro-
ducers operate globally in most cases, and their products are available in almost all countries in the world170.
Besides, 80% of pharmaceutical turnover is produced in the OECD countries (which include all EU member
states and the US) 171.
In a context as that described above, some experts have put forward the necessity of setting up an “integrated
global drug approval mechanism”172. The EMEA model is itself a good example of how national authorities
can be coordinated by and act jointly with a supranational authority. However, the creation of a global
authority for orphan drug regulation or, more generally, drug overview, is an utopia in the midterm, and
other, more modest alternatives should be devised. Currently, the sounder alternative is the strengthening
of collaborative agreements between diﬀerent national authorities, such as the one implemented between the
FDA and its Australian counterpart173. This would avoid a considerable amount of uncertainty for sponsors,
168Milne et al, supra note 11, at 46-59.
169EMEA Report, supra note 59, at 15.
170Hogan, supra note 89, at 546.
171Id. at 547.
172Id. at 559.
173Cf. the discussion in Section 2.2. However, as Hogan asserts, “the FDA has been particularly reluctant to relinquish
ultimate control over the drug review processes” Id. at 560.
33as well as some of their costs (repetitive clinical trials with diﬀerent standards and the like). Besides, the
close similarities between the diﬀerent regulatory frameworks constitute a good starting point for a deeper
harmonization of the approval processes by creating common international standards174. At least some
modest steps towards harmonization may be foreseen, such the establishment of uniform rules on clinical
trials like those discussed at the International Conferences on Harmonization175 or the issuance of protocols
favoring the ﬂux and dissemination of information between regulators and experts worldwide176. Anyway,
a more complete harmonization appears to be an increasingly important objective for regulators to respond
to the reality they try to monitor, which inevitably tends to a global market.
4.7.
Brief Considerations on EU-Speciﬁc Problems.
Finally, some concise considerations must be made with regard to two particular issues that arise exclusively
in the European Union regulatory framework. First, reference will be made to the particular structure of the
European scheme and, in particular, the two-level enforcement format (States-Community bodies). Second,
the lack of both a comprehensive grant program and a tax system that may widen considerably the spectrum
of incentives can be a serious handicap for the European orphan drug laws.
One of the serious challenges that the European orphan drug regulation must tackle is the existence of two
levels of decision and enforcement, that managed by the Community entities (COMP, EMEA, Commission)
and that under the supervision of national authorities177. This double-channel structure contrasts with the
simple and eﬀective US design: a single and powerful body, the Federal Drug Administration through the
Oﬃce of Orphan Products Development (OOPD). The alternative between the centralized procedure on
one hand and the national procedures via mutual recognition within the Community is good principle to
harmonize the European system. However, two main risks exist: ﬁrst, the existence of at least 16 centers
of decision and review may water down the huge amount of information and expertise that orphan drug
174In fact, the WHO has held several International Conferences on Harmonization on the technical requirements for drug
registration. Cavalier, supra note 154, at 466.
175Id. at 466. The author is pessimistic about the possibility that signiﬁcant substantial progresses towards full harmonization
may be made, and instead encourages at least some less ambitious steps. This seems also to be the intention of the European
regulatory authorities. EMEA Report, supra note 59, at 15-16.
176Id. at 467-473.
177In Spain, for instance, the regulatory body is the Spanish Drug and Medicinal Products Agency (“Agencia Espa˜ nola de
Medicamentos y Productos Sanitarios”).
34and rare diseases regulation require; second, notorious diﬀerences may exist among countries in terms of
drug availability. Furthermore, both hazards may become more intense after the enlargement scheduled for
May 1st 2004, when 10 more countries will join the EU. The ﬁrst potential risk seems to have been averted
though an intense cooperation among authorities and the creation of a European network of experts to
channel information dissemination and to assist COMP and CPMP178. The second hazard appears to have
lead to practical disparities among countries; the EMEA Report published in April 2003 established that
even the ﬁrst ﬁve orphan products approved by the centralized procedure (therefore, not even by national
authorities), presented striking diﬀerences in terms of their availability in the 15 member states179. If this
happens with marketing authorizations applying in the entire EU territory at a time, the perspectives for
mutual recognition to provide great heterogeneity must be clearly pessimistic. Only better coordination and
expedited approvals may solve what constitute a serious disadvantage vis-` a-vis the American procedures.
Another serious handicap for the development of the European framework is the absence of two categories
of incentives that are present in the United States and are responsible in a signiﬁcant proportion of the
success of the Orphan Drug Act. These key incentives include the worldwide-admired FDA grant program
and the tax legislation which provides diﬀerent kinds of credits and reductions. The FDA grant program
has funded 25 rare disease treatments that later became marketed orphan drugs180, and in 2002, the House
Commerce Committee voted unanimously to boost the budgetary appropriation allocated to the development
of treatments for rare diseases, authorizing $25 million annually for 4 years181. There is no fair comparison
with what is being done on the other side of the Atlantic, where grant programs for orphan drug development
are embodied in larger campaigns to fund scientiﬁc research and where the amounts are considerably lower182.
In light of all these considerations, the fee exemptions and protocol assistance in the European Union, should
be coupled with an speciﬁc grant program similar to that applied in the US183.
The situation with tax credits is even worse. The EU bodies lack authority to take decisions on tax issues,
178EMEA Report, supra note 59, at 28-29.
179For instance, in Belgium only 1 of these products was available when the survey was conducted, while all the 5 drugs were
already marketed in Austria or the UK. Id. at 62-66.
180Haﬀner, supra note , 28 at 39.
181Daniel B. Moskovitz, Federal and State Laws and Regulations Aﬀecting Managed Care 14(10) Drug Beneﬁt Trends, 13-
14 (2002). Since 1983, more than $67.5 million has been allocated among more than 234 studies. Haﬀner, supra note , at
594. Clinical trials are normally awarded grants from $100,000 to $200,000 per year in direct costs for up to 3 years. Cf.
<http://www.fda.gov/orphan/grants/faq.htm>.
182The 4th and the 5th Framework Programs mentioned in Section 2.3 provided funding for rare diseases research since 1994
up to a total of ¨ A8.65 and ¨ A15.6 million respectively. Hansen, supra note 37, at 43.
183The 2003 EMEA Report made exactly this suggestion. EMEA Report, supra note 59, at 14.
35which are tied to the sovereignty of member states. Only a few European countries (France, the UK
and the Netherlands) have amended their own legislations to include tax credits for orphan research and
development184. This response is still weak and must be completed by other fellow members as soon as
possible, in order for the European pharmaceutical and biotechnological industry to compete in equal terms
with their American counterparts. Furthermore, tax beneﬁts contribute to drop industry costs, and therefore,
they may trigger lower prices for orphan drugs. However, it must be noted that the American tax credit
scheme185 has been criticized for being “ineﬀective” in the US, so these attacks must be carefully considered
by European governments when designing their own tax models186.
5.
Conclusion.
Orphan drug laws have made great contributions towards the cure of millions of people suﬀering from
uncommon and frequently life-threatening diseases since their ﬁrst exponent was enacted in the US in 1983.
By providing various incentives for the industry to adopt these “orphans”, research and commercialization
have been considerably improved.
The success of the Orphan Drug Act and ancillary legislation was such that countries all over the world have
passed statutes with similar purposes and almost identical content. The European Union joined this group of
orphan legislators in 2000, after several years of study and debate. However, since the very early stages of the
application of the American legal architecture, some critiques have been arising, critiques that in most cases
can be extended to the more recent orphan drug laws as well. This is surely the case of the EU Regulations,
that in general terms suﬀer from the same caveats of their American counterpart. For a long time, what this
paper calls “orphan blockbusters” and the abuses by some sponsors attracted most of the attention of the
literature. Nevertheless, some new challenges have been put forward by the scientiﬁc community and various
commentators; among them, the advocated extension of orphan legislation to cover remedies for third-world
diseases and the need for international coordination in the ﬁeld deserve special consideration. Although the
184Id. at 39-40.
185As it was described in Section 2.1, tax credits amount to 50% of the total amount of money spent on clinical trials.
186Pulsinelli mentions as the main caveats of the actual system in the US the exclusion of animal trials, the fact that the credit
cannot be carried forward to future years or backward to past tax periods, and the requirement that the beneﬁted company
must be “carrying on a business”. Pulsinelli, supra note 5, at 337-338. Pointing to the same direction, cf. Henry, supra note
117, at 636.
36same controversies that have taken place in the US may be foreseen in Europe, it is necessary to recognize
that the European legislators attempted to settle some of them before they arise, and that is the case of
the revocation of market exclusivity laid down in Regulation 141/2000, which constitutes a serious but still
untested attempt to avoid proﬁtable orphans.
Orphan drug laws were initially conceived as an instrument for society to ﬁll the void left by market in
a socially-sensitive area such as the cure of rare diseases and the right to health, no matter what nature
(and the prevalence) of the condition one is aﬄicted with. In order to achieve this purpose, any orphan
drug law must strike a fair balance between competition and innovation, which has been achieved to a high
degree in both the US and the EU. However, some improvements may be made and some new situations
may be confronted, as this paper attempted to put forward. The words used by Rohde referring to the
US Orphan Drug Act may be extended to the EU Regulations as well: “with ’ﬁne tuning’ to address the
criticism addressed at certain of its provisions, the Act can be a more eﬃcient engine of innovation”187.
187Rohde, supra note 19, at 143.
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